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final bits.
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1. Introduction
Compared with the existing classical private communication methods, quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) is believed to have the special advantage of unconditional security. Since Bennett
and Brasard [1] proposed their protocol (the so called BB84 protocol) QKD has now been ex-
tensively studied both theoretically [1–14] and experimentally. The central issue of QKD in
practice is its unconditional security. The real set-up can actually be different from the assumed
ideal case in many aspects. For example, the existing real set-ups use an imperfect single-
photon source with a lossy channel, which is different from the assumed ideal protocol where
one can use a perfect single-photon source. Therefore, the security is undermined by the photon-
number-splitting attack [9, 10]. Fortunately, there are a a number of methods [4, 5, 11–24] can
be used to overcome the issue in practical QKD where we only use the imperfect source. The
ILM-GLLP proof [5, 6] has shown that if we know the upper bound of fraction of the multi-
photon counts (or equivalently, the lower bound of single-photon counts) among all raw bits,
we still have a way to distill the secure final key. Verifying such a bound is strongly non-trivial.
One can faithfully estimate such bounds with the decoy-state method [4, 11–14], where the
intensity of pulses are randomly changed among a few different values.
So far the decoy-state method has been extensively studied in many experiments [25–38]
with different realization methods, including the phase coding method [25, 28, 29], the photon
polarization method [26, 27], in free space [27] and optical fiber [26, 28, 29]. The recently
developed superconducting detector technology can significantly improve the QKD distance
[29–33]. So far, the most updated record of the QKD distance is 250km [32], reported by
Stucki et al. However, the decoy-state method is not implemented there.
Different realizations of BB84 protocol may have different technical advantages and dis-
advantages. For example, polarization coding has its advantage in passively switching the
measurement basis, while optical fiber based QKD can be directly developed for a network
secure private quantum key distribution [34]. However, photon polarization may change signif-
icantly over long distance transmission through an optical fiber. Robust polarization transmis-
sion in optical fiber has been achieved by optical compensation [26, 39].
Here we report our new experimental result with photon polarization transmitted by opti-
cal fiber, over a distance of 200km. Our result here has kept the advantages of polarization
coding and optical-fiber based photon transmission as our earlier result [26], but has reached
a longer secure distance by using superconducting detectors. Also, as shown below, together
with a superconducting detector, the polarization coding can have one more advantage in the
synchronization. In principle, the synchronization pulses are not necessary in our system if one
has a very precise local clock at the detection side.
2. Polarization coding, superconducting detector, and synchronization
In a BB84 protocol [1], there is a sender, Alice and a receiver, Bob. Besides sending Bob the
weak coding pulses of BB84 states, Alice also sends Bob synchronization pulses as a clock, so
that Bob can know the position of each of his detected results. In principle, the synchronization
pulses do not have to be run in the same frequency with the weak coding pulses. For example,
if Bob has a very precise clock, they don’t need the high frequency synchronization pulses in
the whole protocol. However, in all existing real set-ups, even we have such an expensive clock,
the high frequency synchronization is still necessary because they are needed in measurement,
if we use phase coding or if we use the gated mode for the single photon detector.
Consider a system using phasing coding first. There, the signal detection at Bob’s side is
done actively. Immediately before the detecting each individual signals, an active phase shift
is taken to the signal pulse, which works as the random selection of measurement basis. In
such a system, each individual signal pulse must be accompanied by a synchronization pulse
as a clock so that the phase shift can be done at the right time. Second, consider a system with
normal single-photon detectors, using either phase coding or polarization coding. In this case,
normally the detector is run in a frequency of a few Mega Hertz. The detector has to be run in
a gated mode, otherwise there will be too many dark counts and no final key can be distilled
out. Such a gated mode also requires each coding signal be accompanied by a synchronization
pulse so that the detector is gated at the right time window in detecting each coding signal.
The situation is different if one uses polarization coding with a superconducting detector.
First, the detector’s repetition rate is so high that it can be run in the always-on mode rather
than the gated mode. Second, unlike the case of phase coding, photon polarization detection is
done passively. There is no active operation on each signal. Therefore, in principle, in such a
case, the synchronization pulses are not necessary in the system, if one has a very precise local
clock. A very precise local clock is technically difficult and expensive. However, the existing
economic local clock technology can run rather precisely in a short period. This allows one to
make the synchronization block by block, given such a simple local clock at Bob’s side. Say,
one needs only one synchronization pulse for a block of (many) signals.
3. Our set-up
Our set-up is shown schematically in Figure 1. Two sides, Alice and Bob are linked by 200 km
optical fiber. Decoy pulses of BB84 polarization states are sent to Bob through the optical fiber.
They are detected at Bob’s side by superconducting single-photon detectors.
3.1. Source
We use the weak coherent light as our source. The main idea of the decoy-state method is to
change intensities randomly among different values in sending out each pulses. Here we change
the intensity of each pulses among 3 different values: 0, 0.2, 0.6, which are called vacuum pulse,
decoy-pulse, and signal pulse, respectively. Alice’s probabilities of sending a vacuum pulse, a
decoy pulse and a signal pulse are 1:1:2 . The experiment lasts for 3089 seconds.
As shown in Fig.1, the coherent light pulses in our experiment are produced by 8 diodes
which are controlled by 4-bit random numbers random numbers. The first two bits of a random
number determines whether to produce a vacuum pulse, a decoy pulse, or a signal pulse. In
particular, if they are 00, none of the diode sends out any pulse, i.e., a vacuum pulse is produced;
if they are 01, one of the 4 decoy diodes in the figure produces a decoy pulse; if they are 10 or
11, one of the 4 signal diodes in the figure produces a signal pulse. The last 2 bits of the 4-bit
random number decides which of the 4 diodes is chosen to produce the pulse (If the first two
bits are not 00 ). The light intensities are controlled by an attenuator after each diodes, 0.2 for
the decoy pulse and 0.6 for the signal pulse. Each diodes will produce only one polarization
from the 4 BB84 states, i.e., the horizontal, vertical, pi/4, 3pi/4. Polarization maintaining beam
splitters (PMBS) are used to guide pulses from the decoy diode and the signal diode in the same
polarization block into one PMBS. Two polarization maintaining polarization beam splitters are
used to guide pulses from all diodes to one optical fiber. The fidelity of our polarization states is
larger than 99.9%. The Pulses produced by the laser diodes first passes through a polarization
maintaining beam-splitter (BS), then a polarization beam splitter (PBS) and then combined by
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Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of our set-up. BS: polarization maintaining beam splitter, PBS:
polarization maintaining polarization beam splitter, SBS: single mode beam splitter, SPBS:
single mode polarization beam splitter, FF: 0.2nm bandpass filter, Att: attenuator, SOA:
Semiconductor Optical Amplifier, PD: photo detector, TDC: Time to Digital Converter.
PC: polarization controller.
a single mode BS. These pulses are sent to Bob through the optical fiber of a 200 km long, in
side the lab.
3.2. Detection
The circuit at Bob’s side is is a standard design of BB84 detection. Four super-conducting
single-photon detectors are used to detect signals. These detectors are made by Scontel com-
pany in Russia. We have set the environmental temperature lower than 2.4k. The dark count
rate of each detectors is smaller than 1 Hz and the detection efficiency of 3 of them is larger
than 4%, one of them is larger than 3%.
3.3. Clock
The 40k Hz synchronization pulses are originated from the 320M Hz clock which drives a laser
diode to produce synchronization pulses. In order to observe the detect the synchronization
pulses at Bob’s side which is linked to Alice by 200 km optical fiber, a semiconductor optical
amplifier is inserted at the point of 100 km, amplifying the intensity of optical pulses by 100
before transmission over the second half of the optical fiber. At Bob’s side, a photon-electrical
detector is used to recover the synchronization pulses. Both the synchronization pulses and the
electrical signal from the superconductor detector are sent to a time-to-digit convertor (TDC)
which works as an ”economic local clock”.
4. Calculation of the final key
The secure final keys can be distilled with an imperfect source given the separate theoretical
results from Ref. [5]. We regard the upper bound of the fraction of tagged bits as those raw bits
generated by multiphoton pulses from Alice, or equivalently, the lower bound of the fraction
of untagged bits as those raw bits generated by single-photon pulses from Alice. In Wang’s
3-intensity decoy-state protocol [12], Alice can randomly use 3 different intensities (average
photon numbers) of each pulses (0, µ , µ ′)as the vacuum pulses, decoy pulses and signal pulses.
Alice produce the states by different intensities in Eq.1.
ρµ = e−µ |0〉〈0|+ µe−µ |1〉〈1|+ cρc,
ρµ ′ = e−µ
′ |0〉〈0|+ µ ′e−µ ′ |1〉〈1|+ µ ′2e−µ
′
µ2e−µ cρc + dρd.
(1)
Here c = 1− e−µ − µe−µ , ρc = e−µc ∑∞n=2 µ
n
n! |n〉〈n|,ρd is a density operator, and d > 0(here
we use the same notation in Ref. [12]. In the protocol, Bob records all the states which he
observed his detector click. After Alice sent out all the pulses, Bob announced his record.
Then they known the number of the counts C0, Cµ , Cµ ′ which came from different intensities
0, µ , µ ′. N0, Nµ , Nµ ′ are the pulse numbers of intensity 0, µ , µ ′ which Alice sent out. The
counting rates (the counting probability of Bobs detector whenever Alice sends out a state)
of pulses of each intensities can be calculate S0 = C0/N0, Sµ = Cµ/Nµ and Sµ ′ = Cµ ′/Nµ ′ ,
respectively. We denote s0(s′0), s1(s′1) and sc(s′c) for the counting rates of those vacuum pulses,
singlephoton pulses, and ρc pulses from ρµ (ρµ ′). Asymptotically, the values of primed symbols
here should be equal to those values of unprimed symbols. However, in an experiment the
number of samples is finite; therefore they could be a bit different. The bound values of s1, s′1
can be determined by the following joint constraints equations:
Sµ = e−µs0 + µe−µs1 + csc,
cs′c ≤ µ
2e−µ
µ ′2e−µ ′
(
Sµ ′ − µ ′e−µ ′s′1 − e−µ
′
s′0
)
,
(2)
where s′1 =(1− 10e
µ/2√
µs1Nµ
)s1, s
′
c =(1− 10√scNµ )sc, s
′
0 =(1−r0)S0, s0 =(1+r0)S0, and r0 = 10√S0N0
to obtain the worst-case results [12]. Given these, one can calculate s1, s′1, sc numerically.
In the experiment, Alice totally transmits about N pulses to Bob. After the transmission, Bob
announces the pulse sequence numbers and basis information of received states. Then Alice
broadcasts to Bob the actual state class information and basis information of the corresponding
pulses. Alice and Bob can calculate the experimentally observed quantum bit error rate (QBER)
values Eµ , Eµ ′ of decoy states and signal states according to all the decoy bits and a small
fraction of the signal bits, respectively. Since we exploit Eµ and Eµ ′ from finite test bit, the
statistical fluctuation should be consider to evaluate the error rate of the remaining bit.
EUµ ′(µ) = Eµ ′(µ)+ 10
√
Eµ ′(µ)
Cµ ′(µ)L
p
µ ′(µ)
, (3)
Lpµ ′(µ) is the proportion of the test bits for the phase-flip test in single states (decoy state). Then
we can numerically calculate a tight lower bound of the counting rate of single-photon s′1 using
Eq. (2). The next step is to estimate the fraction of single-photon ∆1 and the QBER upper bound
of single-photon E1. We use
∆µ
′
1 = s
′
1µ ′e−µ
′
/Sµ ′ ,∆
µ
1 = s1µe−µ/Sµ (4)
to conservatively calculate ∆1 of signal states and decoy states, respectively [12]. And E1 of
signal states and decoy states can be estimated by the following formula:
Eµ
′(µ)
1 =
(
EUµ ′(µ)−
(1− r0)S0e−µ ′(µ)
2Sµ ′(µ)
)
/∆µ
′(µ)
1 . (5)
Here we consider the statistical fluctuations of the vacuum states to obtain the worst-case re-
sults.
Lastly, we can calculate the final key rates of signal states using the following formula [12]:
Rµ ′ = Sµ ′
[
∆µ
′
1 −H
(
Eµ ′
)−∆µ ′1 H (Eµ ′1 )] . (6)
Here H(x) =−xlog2(x)− (1− x)log2(1− x).
We consider the final key rate of the decoy states independently. During the above calcula-
tion, we have used the worst case results in every step for the security. Obviously, there are more
economic methods for the calculation of final key rate of the decoy states. Here we have not
considered the consumption of raw keys for the QBER test. Now we reconsider the key rate cal-
culation of decoy states above. We assumed the worst case of s0 =(1+r0)S0 and s0 =(1−r0)S0
for calculating ∆µ1 and E
µ
1 , respectively. Although we do not exactly know the true value of
s0, there must be one fixed value for both calculations. Therefore we can choose every possible
value in the range of (1− r0)S0 ≤ s0 ≤ (1+ r0)S0 and use it to calculate ∆µ1 , Eµ1 and the final
key rate, and then pick out the smallest value as the lower bound of decoy states key rate. As
the Fig. 3 in [26] , we set s0 = (1− r0)S0 to calculate the lower bound of decoy states key
rate. This economic calculation method can obtain a more tightened value of the lower bound,
which is larger than the result using the simple calculation method above with the two-step
worst-case assumption for s0 values. We can calculate the final key rates of decoy states using
the following formula with Equ. 3.
Rµ = Sµ
[
∆µ1 −H
(
Eµ
)−∆µ1 H (Eµ1 )] . (7)
Half of the experimental data should be discarded due to the measurement basis mismatch in
the BB84 protocol. Among the remaining half, the ratio Lpµ ′(µ) are consumed for the phase-flip
test and Lbµ ′(µ) are consumed for the bit-flip test. Then we can calculate the final rate which
exploit from single states and decoy states.
Kµ ′(µ) =
1
2 (1−L
p
µ ′(µ)−Lbµ ′(µ))Rµ ′(µ)Nµ ′(µ). (8)
In the experiment, the pulse numbers ratio of the 3 intensities 0, µ and µ ′ is 1:1:2 and the
intensities of signal states and decoy states are fixed at µ ′ = 0.6 and µ = 0.2, respectively.
The numbers of the counts from 0, µ anf µ ′ are 3263, 77157 and 449467. We calculate the
experimentally observed QBER values Eµ , Eµ ′ of decoy states and signal states are 4.0426%,
1.964%. The experiment lasts for T = 3089 seconds. We use Lpµ ′ = L
p
µ = 10% for phase-flip
test, and Lbµ ′ = L
b
µ = 5% for bit-flip test. The experimental parameters and their corresponding
values are listed in Table 1. After calculation, we obtain a final key rate of 11.8 bits/s for the
signal states (intensity µ ′ = 0.6) and a final key rate of 2.9 bits/s for the decoy states (intensity
µ = 0.2).
Table 1. Experimental parameters (P) and their corresponding value of 200 km (Value)
decoy-state QKD.
P Value P Value P Value P Value
L 200 km Sµ ′ 9.0941× 10−7 EUµ ′ 0.0263 EUµ 0.0633
f 320 MHz Sµ 3.12225× 10−7 Eµ
′
1 0.0496 E
µ
1 0.0682
N 9.8848× 1011 S0 1.32041× 10−8 Rµ ′ 1.7445× 10−7 Rµ 6.7564× 10−8
Eµ ′ 0.0196 s′1 1.2788× 10−6 Kµ ′ 3.6644× 104 Kµ 7.0960× 103
Eµ 0.0404 s1 1.3707× 10−6 Kµ ′/T 11.8626Hz Kµ/T 2.2972Hz
5. Concluding remarks
In summary, with a superconducting detector, we have demonstrated a decoy-state QKD over
200km distance in polarization coding and optical fiber. In our experiment, the synchroniza-
tion system is significantly simplified. In principle, the frequent synchronization pulses are not
necessary in our set-up if one has a very precise local clock.
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